Legal Issues Surrounding Preemployment Physical Examinations in the Coal Industry by Stickler, Daniel L. & Sebok, Albert F.
Volume 94
Issue 3 The National Coal Issue Article 6
April 1992
Legal Issues Surrounding Preemployment Physical
Examinations in the Coal Industry
Daniel L. Stickler
Jackson & Kelly
Albert F. Sebok
Jackson & Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Diagnosis Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and
Mineral Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel L. Stickler & Albert F. Sebok, Legal Issues Surrounding Preemployment Physical Examinations in the Coal Industry, 94 W. Va. L.
Rev. (1992).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss3/6
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING
PREEMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS IN
THE COAL INDUSTRY
DANIEL L. STICKLER*
ALBERT F. SEBOK**
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 811
II. STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS REGULATING PREEMPLOY-
MENT EXAMINATIONS ............................................. 812
A. Federal Handicap Discrimination Laws ............. 812
B. Federal Mine Laws ........................................ 817
C. State Laws ................................................... 817
III. PREEMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS AND
DISCRIMINATION ................................................... 819
A. Federal and State Handicap Discrimination
L aws ........................................................... 819
B. Federal Mine Laws ........................................ 828
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ..................... 829
IV. PREEMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS AND COM-
MON LAW CLAIMS ................................................ 830
A. Invasion of Privacy 830
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 834
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the physical nature of most jobs in a coal mine, many
coal companies require applicants to satisfactorily complete pre-
employment physical examinations. These examinations are generally
one part of an application process designed to obtain an employee
that is best suited for the job. With the increasing costs associated
with workers' compensation and absenteeism, it is understandable
that employers are concerned about an individual's physical con-
dition. Moreover, an individual's inability to perform the job due
* Partner, Jackson & Kelly, Charleston, West Virginia. B.A., West Virginia University, 1967;
J.D. West Virginia University, 1970.
** Partner, Jackson & Kelly, Charleston, West Virginia. A.B., Albion College, 1982; J.D.,
Washington & Lee University, 1985.
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to physical limitations could endanger the safety of other employees
in the mine.
For many years, applicants accepted preemployment physical ex-
aminations without legal challenge. Recently, however, applicants
have begun to challenge both the procedures used by employers in
conducting these examinations and the results of such examinations.
Two factors have contributed to applicants becoming more aggres-
sive in challenging the legality of preemployment physical exami-
nations. First, the passage of handicap discrimination laws during
the 1970s has restricted an employer's ability to deny employment
to applicants suffering from physical limitations. Second, our society
has become more conscious about the rights of the individual over
the last two decades. Employees have begun suing their employers
for invasions of workplace privacy, and juries have been willing to
punish employers for what they perceive to be unreasonable intru-
sions into employees' privacy.'
This Article examines the legal issues that arise when employers
require job applicants to complete preemployment physicals as a
condition of employment. Federal and selected state statutes and
regulations which limit the scope of preemployment physicals will
be discussed. Additionally, the legal problems will be discussed which
may arise when an employer refuses to hire an applicant because
of the applicant's physical condition. Finally, state common law
claims that impact preemployment physical examinations will be re-
viewed.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS REGULATING PREEMPLOYMENT
ExAMINATIONS
A. Federal Handicap Discrimination Laws
There are two federal acts which prohibit employers from dis-
criminating against handicapped or disabled individuals. The Re-
1. I. M. SHPARD & R. DUsToN, WORKPLACE PRIvAcY 1-2 (1987). Their study stated:
The nationwide average jury verdict during the 1985-1987 period in workplace privacy cases
brought by employees against their employers was $316,000.
The average verdict - $316,000 - is even more significant when compared with the average
for the 1979-1980 period - $0. During the latter period, there were no reported workplace
privacy jury verdicts.
The total number of reported workplace privacy jury verdicts against employers nationwide
increased twenty-fold between the 1981-1984 period and the 1985-1987 period.
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habilitation Act of 19732 and the Americans With Disabilities Act
of 1990 ("ADA"),3 the latter of which becomes effective July 26,
1992.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is more limited in scope than the
ADA. Whether an employer is covered under the Rehabilitation Act
depends upon an employer's relationship with the federal govern-
ment. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act extends only to federal
contractors, i.e., employers who have entered into federal prime
contracts or subcontracts for an amount in excess of $2,500.4 A coal
company is covered by Section 503 only if it has a coal supply
contract with a department or agency of the federal government.
Under Section 503, federal contractors are required to take affir-
mative action to employ individuals with handicaps.5 Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act covers employers who are the recipients of
federal funds. 6 Recipients of federal funds are prohibited from dis-
criminating against individuals with a handicap.7
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA which is largely modeled
after the statutory provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the re-
gulations promulgated by executive agencies under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.8 The ADA, however, varies in several sig-
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96(i) (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988). Congress vested the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams (OFCCP) with the power to enforce Section 503. Employees aggrieved by violations of Section
503 have no private right of action in court but must resolve their complaint through an administrative
procedure administered by the OFCCP. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26(a) (1990); see also Hodges v. Atchison,
T & S.F. Ry., 728 F.2d 414, 416-17 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984); D'Amato
v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1482 (7th Cir. 1985).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1988); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4 (1990). The Section 503 regulations provide
various policies and practices that a contractor must follow to comply with the "affirmative action"
requirement. For example, contractors must adopt a schedule to review physical or mental job qual-
ification requirements to see that they do not screen out qualified handicapped individuals and are
consistent with business necessity. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c) (1990). Contractors are also required
to engage in outreach and positive recruitment activities in an effort to employ handicapped indi-
viduals. Id. § 60-741.6(0.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). Until 1988, the reach of Section 504 was somewhat limited.
Courts had held that the statute's restrictions did not apply to an entire institution but only to the
program or activity that was actually receiving the federal funds. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555, 573 (1984). Congress, however, passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 which
expanded the definition of program or activity to include the entire institution or entity. See Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
8. See HENRY PERRT, JR., AMERiCANS WITH DIsABilrnis ACT HANDBOOK vii (1990).
1992]
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nificant aspects from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Due to the
limited scope of this Article, however, only two areas of variance
between the Acts will be discussed.9 First, a private employer's re-
lationship to the federal government is of no consequence in de-
termining whether an employee is covered by the ADA. Instead, the
ADA covers all private employers having 15 or more employees on
each working day for 20 calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year.' 0 Second, Congress substituted the word "disability" for
"handicap" in the ADA because Congress perceived that individuals
with disabilities objected to the term "handicapped."" Congress,
however, intended that the term "disability" have the same meaning
as the term "handicap" has under the Rehabilitation Act.' 2
These two federal statues regulate the employers ability to require
and use preemployment physical examinations. It should be noted
that neither Section 503 nor Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 contain any express language relating to preemployment
physical examinations. However, preemployment physical exami-
nations are covered in regulations promulgated pursuant to the au-
thority granted in Sections 503 and 504. Although there is only one
set of administrative regulations issued for Section 503,11 Section
504 permits the head of any federal executive agency or department
to promulgate regulations for programs funded by that agency or
department.' 4 Twenty-four agencies have issued final regulations un-
9. Another difference between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act is the standard of proof
required to establish a violation. Under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove that the sole
reason that he was discriminated against was because of his handicap. See Pierce v. Engle, 726 F.
Supp. 1231 (D. Kan. 1989) (dismissing school principal's claim of handicap discrimination under
Section 504 because principal alleged that his contract was not renewed since he was a recovering
alcoholic and because of dissatisfaction with his job performance). On the other hand, the ADA,
like Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, only requires the plaintiff to show
that he was discriminated against because of his disability. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp.
1991).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991). For the first two years after the ADA
becomes effective, employers are covered only if they employ 25 or more employees for each working
day for 20 calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. Id.
11. See H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Congress, 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-33.
12. Id.
13. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 (1990).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
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der Section 504.15 Although the regulations issued by most of these
agencies are nearly identical, some agencies, such as the Department
of Labor, have promulgated more comprehensive regulations. 16
Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA specifically addresses
preemployment physical examinations in the text of the Act. 7 The
ADA's provisions which relate to preemployment physicals are largely
patterned after the regulations promulgated by executive agencies
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
the ADA expressly permit preemployment physical examinations."
Although the Section 504 regulations and the ADA limit an em-
ployer's ability to question applicants about a physical disability or
handicap, 9 neither the Section 504 regulations nor the ADA limit
15. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985).
16. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 32.15 (1991) (regulations promulgated by Department of Labor) with
45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1991) (regulations promulgated by Department of Health and Human Services).
With regard to preemployment physical examinations, the Department of Labor (DOL) requires any
recipient of its funds to use a physician for preemployment examinations that is "qualified to make
functional assessments of individuals in a form which will express residual capacity for work or
training." 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(c)(1) (1991). The physician must provide officials with information about
any functional limitations of the applicant which are relevant to job placement. Id. The DOL re-
gulations further provide that the results of the medical examination must be specific and objective
and must be sent to both the applicant and employing official at the same time. Id. § 32.15(c)(2).
The employing official using the information should be familiar with the activities involved in per-
forming the job. Id. § 32.15(c)(3). No employing official may look at the results of the examination
until a conditional decision to make an offer of employment to the applicant has been made, id. §
32.15(c)(5)(ii), and the results of the medical examination will be the last factor used by the employing
official in deciding whether to make a job offer. See id. at § 32.15(c)(5), (6).
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (West Supp. 1991).
18. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3) (1990); 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(c) (1991); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)
(West Supp. 1991).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(a) (1991) (regulations promulgated by Department of Labor); 45
C.F.R. 84.14(a) (1991) (regulations promulgated by Department of Health and Human Services); 28
C.F.R. § 42.513(a) (1991) (regulations promulgated by Department of Justice); 42 U.S.C.A. §
12112(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991). Section 504 and the ADA prohibits employers from requesting job
applicants to answer questions about the existence, nature, or severity of any disability or handicap.
However, employers may make preemployment inquiries about an applicant's ability to perform job
related functions. Id. § 12112(c)(2)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(a) (1991). Moreover, employers may request
all applicants to describe or demonstrate how, with or without reasonable accommodation, they could
perform the job. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,737 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a)). One federal
court has construed the Section 504 regulations to prohibit employers from inquiring specifically about
particular physical or mental illnesses. See Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.
N.Y. 1981) (enjoining employer from requesting applicants to identify whether they had ever been
treated for mental illness because question was not job related). The court noted that the employer
would not have violated the law if it had asked applicants whether they were capable of dealing with
emotionally demanding situations. Id. at 337.
19921
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the type of information that a physician may request of applicants
during the course of a preemployment physical examination. In this
regard, the ADA provides that preemployment physical examina-
tions do not have to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 2° However, if the employer uses the criteria to dispro-
portionately exclude individuals with disabilities, then the test criteria
must be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
The ADA and Section 504 regulations do limit the timing and
manner of examinations in three ways. First, the employer can re-
quire a preemployment physical examination only after an offer has
been made to the applicant. The offer, however, can be made con-
tingent upon the applicant passing the preemployment physical ex-
amination. Second, the employer must require all applicants from
a given job category who have been made offers to take the physical
examination. 2' Third, the employer must collect information ob-
tained by preemployment physical examinations on separate forms,
maintain the records in separate files and treat the information as
confidential medical records. 22 The ADA and Section 504 regula-
tions, however, provide that supervisors and managers may be in-
formed about any applicable work restrictions of an employee.23
Like the ADA, the Section 503 regulations require that test re-
sults be held in confidenceu and that the procedures used do not
disparately impact against handicapped individuals. 25 However, un-
like the ADA, Section 503 regulations do not require employers to
give physical examinations to all entering employees or require that
the physical examination be given only after an offer of employment
has been made to the applicant.
Neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA expressly prohibit
any specific testing procedure. The ADA, however, does make spe-
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(6) (West Supp. 1991). The ADA permits greater leeway in con-
ducting preemployment physical examinations than in conducting physical examinations of current
employees. Any physical examination or inquiry of a current employee must be job related and
consistent with business necessity. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(c)(4) (1991); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(d) (1991); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(d)(2) (1991); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1991).
24. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(C)(3) (1990).
25. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(C)(2) (1990).
[Vol. 94
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cific reference to drug testing. The ADA provides that a drug test
is not to be considered a medical examination.2 6 The ADA also pro-
vides that no provision of the ADA shall be construed either to
authorize or to prohibit drug testing.27 The regulations under Section
503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do not, in any fashion, refer
to drug testing.
B. Federal Mine Laws
Federal mine laws do not contain any provisions relating to pre-
employment physical examinations. After an individual begins em-
ployment, however, a mine operator is required, at its own expense,
to give the miner a chest x-ray to determine if the miner has pneu-
moconiosis. 28
C. State Laws
Almost all states have enacted some form of handicap discrim-
ination laws. 29 Many of these state handicap laws regulate preem-
ployment physical examinations. For example, the West Virginia
Human Rights Commission regulations require that preemployment
physical examinations must relate to minimum physical standards
necessary to the job and all applicants must be subjected to the
examination.30 Maryland law forbids an employer from requiring
medical examinations unless the information requested has a direct
relationship to the ability to do the job.3 1 Almost all states require
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
28. 30 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1988). If the miner's chest x-ray shows evidence of the development
of pneumoconiosis, the miner has the right to transfer to work in a less-dusty area of the mine without
a decrease in compensation. See 30 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988). Moreover, an operator cannot discriminate
against a miner because he has pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 938(a) (1988); see also Goff v.
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 3 Mine Safety & Health Cas. (BNA) 2002 (1985) (holding that miner
who alleged that he was discharged because of pneumoconiosis stated claim under Section 105(c)(1)
of Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1988)).
29. ARaTmn L. LARsON, 3A EMPLoYmENT DiSCR MNATiON § 107.31 (1990); see also 7 Empl.
Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) EP-12,100 to -12,153 (overview of each state handicap discrimination
law).
30. 77 C.S.R. § 1(5.2) (1991).
31. MD. LAB. & EmPL. CODE ANN. § 3-701 (1991).
1992]
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employers to pay for the cost of any medical examinations.32
Moreover, some states have enacted laws prohibiting certain types
of medical examinations. Some states, prohibit tests for sickle cell
trait33 or for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). 4
Oregon prohibits applicants from undergoing genetic screening or
brain-wave testing.35 Oregon also prohibits employers from requiring
prospective employees from taking a breathalyzer test unless the em-
ployer has reasonable grounds to believe the applicant is intoxi-
cated.16
Drug testing is the most regulated area of employment testing.
Several states have passed statutes regulating employer drug testing
of applicants or employees in the private sector. 37 Although these
state statutes generally limit the circumstances under which current
employees may be tested,38 the limitations do not always extend to
32. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 21-3-17 (1989); VA. CODE AN. § 40.1-28 (Michie 1990); 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1001-1003 (1991); Wyo. STAT. § 27-11-113 (1991); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
4113.21 (Anderson 1990); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-301 (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.220
(Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1990); LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 23:897 (West 1985).
33. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.076 (West 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1001-1004 (West
1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1 (1985). New Jersey has promulgated a statute prohibiting discrim-
ination on the basis of any "atypical hereditary cellular blood trait." N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-
12(a) (Vest Supp. 1991).
34. See, e.g., FxA. STAT. Am. § 760.50(3)(a) (West Supp. 1992) (no person may require an
individual to take a human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) related test as a condition of hiring unless
the absence of a HIV-virus is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 111, § 70F (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991) (no employer may require a test for HIV as a condition
of employment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West 1988) (no employer may solicit or require test for
presence of HIV as a condition of employment); see also 7 Empl. Coordinator (Research Inst. Ann.)
EP 18,448 (1992) (discussion of state laws relating to testing applicants and employees for HIV); see
infra note 48 (cases holding AIDS as a handicap under federal and state law).
35. OR. REv. STAT. § 659.227(1) (1991).
36. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 659.225, 659.227 (1991).
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51t to -51aa (West Supp. 1991), FLA. STAT. ANN. §
112.0455 (West Supp. 1992); 35 IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26 §§ 681-690 (West Supp. 1991); LA. REv. STAT. § 49:1001 (Vest Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 181.950-957 (Vest Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §
48-19-01 to -10 (1988); OR. Ra,. STAT. § 438.435(1) (1991); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 28-65-1; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-38-7 (1988); VT. STAT. AN r. tit. 21, §§ 511-520 (1987).
38. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West Supp. 1991) (employer can only test current
employee where there is probable cause to believe that the employee is impaired on job); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-6.5-1(A) (Supp. 1991) (employer may require drug test if it "has reasonable grounds to
believe, based on specific objective facts, that the employee's use of controlled substances is impairing
his or her ability to perform his or her job").
[Vol. 94
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applicants for employment. Nevertheless, a few states do limit testing
of applicants. For example, Montana permits employers to test ap-
plicants only for positions involving hazardous work or safety, se-
curity, or fiduciary responsibility.39 Some states require that an
employer may test an applicant only after giving the applicant an
offer of employment. 40 Other states permit employers to test ap-
plicants only if they have stated this fact in all advertisements and
applications for employment. 4' A small number of states require
applicants to be provided with copies of any positive test results. 42
Statutes also regulate the testing procedures used in the drug
testing of applicants. Often statutes provide the testing must be con-
ducted pursuant to a written drug and alcohol testing policy, pre-
pared by the employer, 43 and that employers confirm the results of
a positive drug test to ensure accuracy. 44 Some states forbid em-
ployers from using a test during which the employer directly observes
the applicant providing a urine sample for drug testing.45
III. PREEMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS AND
DIsCRIUMINATION
A. Federal and State Handicap Discrimination Laws
The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are more concerned with
how employers use information gained during preemployment phys-
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1991).
40. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 181.951 (West Supp. 1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(1)
(West Supp. 1991).
41. IowA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West Supp. 1991).
42. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 514(9) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51v (Vest Supp.
1991). Some statutes require the employer to provide applicants with the test report upon request.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.953 (West Supp. 1992).
43. Mn*N. STAT. ANN. § 181.951; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-7 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 514(2).
44. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1991) (employer must use reliable confirmation
test); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1 (Supp. 1991) (employers must confirm positive drug test results by
gas chromatography/mass spectrometry or its equivalent); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51u (West
Supp. 1991) (positive test result must be confirmed by, two separate drug tests, including gas chro-
matography and mass spectrometry methodology or a methodology more reliable).
45. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51w (West Supp. 1991). Courts have also been
concerned with employers directly observing individuals providing urine samples. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a $125,000 jury verdict based on the fact that the employer negligently
inflicted emotional harm on the employee by observing him providing a urine specimen. See Kelley
v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988).
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ical examinations than with the actual procedures used. It can be
anticipated that courts will carefully scrutinize any instance where
an employer rejects an applicant because of a physical condition
since the main focus of these statutes is to prevent employers from
discriminating against disabled individuals. The purpose of this sec-
tion is not to comprehensively describe handicap discrimination law
under federal or state law; instead, this section will address a few
of the issues that may arise in handicap litigation after an applicant
is refused employment because of the applicant's physical condition.
To understand the potential issues involved in a discrimination
claim, it is important to review those circumstances where an em-
ployer would refuse employment to an individual based upon the
results of a preemployment physical examination. Employers gen-
erally refuse to employ applicants because of the results of a physical
examination for one of three reasons or a combination of the three.
First, the examination shows that the applicant is unable to perform
the functions of the job. Second, the examination indicates that the
applicant is likely to suffer a job-related injury due to his physical
condition. Third, the physical examination shows that the applicant
may pose a threat to the health and safety of other employees as
a result of his physical condition.
Before an applicant can challenge any adverse hiring decision,
there must first be a showing that the applicant is "handicapped"
or "disabled" as those terms are defined under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 or the ADA. The ADA defines "disability" as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
03) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
Individuals with the following conditions have been held to be hand-
icapped: tuberculosis;47 AIDS;48 dyslexia; 49 epilepsy; 0 chronic bron-
46. 42 U.S.C.A. 12102(2) (West Supp. 1991).
47. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
48. Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 50 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 (W.
[Vol. 94
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chitis;51 severe depression and anxiety; 52 congenital back problem; 53
total hearing loss;5 4 and drug addiction. 5 As one would anticipate,
when an employer rejects a job applicant because of the results of
a preemployment physical examination, the applicant will generally
have little problem establishing that the rejection resulted from some
physical impairment disclosed in the physical examination.
The applicant, however, may have a more difficult time estab-
lishing that he or she has a physical impairment which substantially
limits a major life activity. For example, individuals may not be
handicapped if they are suffering from an impairment which is tran-
sitory in nature because the physical impairment may not "sub-
stantially limit" an individual's major life functions.5 6 The ADA
Va. 1990) (asymptomatic carrier of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) antibodies is handicapped
under the West Virginia Human Rights Act).
49. DiPompo v. West Point Military Academy, 708 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
50. Davidson v. Shoney's Big Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d 232 (W. Va. 1989); Kelley v. Bechtel
Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
51. Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 731 P.2d 497 (Wash. 1987).
52. McWilliams v. AT&T Info. Sys., 728 F. Supp. 1186 (W. D. Pa. 1990) (holding that employee
had stated claim for mental impairment under state handicap law when she claimed that she was
diagnosed by psychiatrist as suffering from severe depression and anxiety).
53. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
54. Davis v. Frank, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
55. See Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988); Tinch v. Walters, 765
F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985). The ADA excludes current uses of illegal drugs from protection under the
Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(a). The ADA also amends Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to exclude
illegal drug users from its protection. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 512, 104 Stat. 327, 376-77 (1990).
Before this amendment, current users of drugs were protected by the Rehabilitation Act only if they
could perform their job and were not a threat to the health and safety of others. See 29 U.S.C. §
706(8)(B) (1988); Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986) (court-held that a New York City
police officer who was addicted to heroin and who tested positive for current heroin use was lawfully
terminated under the Rehabilitation Act because his current use made him unfit for his job).
State handicap discrimination laws vary on their treatment of drug addiction as a handicap.
Several states exclude active drug users or abusers from the definition of handicapped individuals.
See N.C. Gm. STAT. § 168A-3(4)(a)(iii)(B) (1987); TEx. Ray. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(4)(A)
(West Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-3 (Michie 1991); Aauz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(4)(a)
(1992). Many statutes do not state whether drug addiction qualifies as a handicap. One state court
has specifically held that individuals with drug addictions are handicapped under state law. See Hazlett
v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio 1986).
56. See Fuqua v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding that employee
who was not permitted to work as general laborer for one year was not disabled under state act
because he was able to continue with active life and secure alternative employment); Evans v. City
of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that employee with knee injury requiring surgery
was not handicapped under Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because knee condition was transitory in
nature).
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regulations define major life activities in the following manner:
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing."' 57 To determine whether an applicant's impairment limits his
or her ability to obtain other employment, courts have analyzed an
individual's education, training, job expectations, and the number
of jobs that the individual is disqualified from because of his or
her impairment.58 In general, an applicant is not substantially limited
from performing a major life function merely because the applicant
cannot do a specific job.59 In this regard, one state court has found
that an applicant for a job in an underground coal mine was not
handicapped merely because she failed a hearing test. 60 In that case,
the court noted that the applicant's hearing problem did not sub-
stantially limit her employment. Courts, however, have held that the
impairment need not limit the employability for many or most jobs
in order to constitute a handicap.61
If the applicant can show that he or she is handicapped or dis-
abled, the question then turns to whether the applicant can perform
the essential functions of the job in question. As noted above, a
common reason that employers give for refusing to employ an ap-
57. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
58. See E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980); Jasany v. United
States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Md. 1988).
59. See Probasco v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n., 420 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1988) (holding that
employee who was discharged because of sensitivity to dust was not handicapped because the condition
did not substantially limit her ability to find other employment); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer,
674 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1983) (one particular job for one particular employer cannot be a major
life activity); Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n., 376 S.E.2d 154 (NV. Va.
1988) (holding that applicant who was prevented from employment as general underground miner in
low coal because of psoriatic lesions was not handicapped because she did not have a physical im-
pairment that substantially limited her major life functions); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.
Supp. 739, 745 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that plaintiff who was not hired as flight attendant because
he exceeded weight limitation had not shown that major life function was affected; court noted that
there is "no authority for the proposition that failure to qualify for a single job because of some
impairment that a plaintiff would otherwise be qualified to perform constitutes being limited in a
major life activity."). But see Brown v. County of Genesee, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1595,
1596 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (Clearly, the fact that plaintiff's diabetic condition caused her to fail the
examination indicates that that impairment was treated as one that substantially limited a major life
activity, working.).
60. Consolidation Coil Co. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n., 473 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio C.P. 1981).
61. See E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
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plicant is that the examining physician does not believe that the
applicant can perform the basic functions of the job. To be protected
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the ADA, the applicant
must show that he or she is not only handicapped but also that he
or she is a "qualified handicapped individual" under the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 or a "qualified individual with a disability"
under the ADA. An individual meets these standards if he or she
can perform the essential functions of the job with or without rea-
sonable accommodation. 2 In determining what are the essential
functions of the job, the ADA provides that:
... consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions
of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.6
The legislative history of the ADA shows that "functions of the
job" are essential only if they are "job-related and consistent with
necessity. "64
Even if unable to perform the essential functions of the job, the
applicant may still be protected if he or she can perform the essential
functions of the job with reasonable accommodation. Generally,
whether reasonable accommodation is available is a fact-specific in-
quiry and the employer has the burden of showing that it could not
accommodate the applicant without undue hardship. 65 The ADA de-
fines reasonable accommodation as:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
62. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8)
(WVest Supp. 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1991).
63. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 1991). The Section 504 regulations do not contain
a similar provision.
64. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 106 (1989).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991); see also Prewitt v. United States Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (under Rehabilitation Act, employer has burden of persuasion
on the issue of reasonable accommodation).
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adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.6
In making reasonable accommodation, an employer need not con-
sider employees for jobs for which they did not apply.67
Accommodation is not reasonable if it would cause the employer
an undue hardship. 8 Nor is the employer required to accommodate
the employee by eliminating an essential function of the job.69
As noted previously, employers will sometimes refuse to hire ap-
plicants because of the risk of future injury. In those situations, the
employer usually does not claim that the applicant cannot currently
perform the job; but rather the employer asserts that the applicant
is likely to injure himself in the future when performing the job.
Because of the rising costs associated with absenteeism and workers'
compensation claims, employers have legitimate reasons for being
concerned with the likelihood that employees may become injured.
Courts, however, have generally viewed with disfavor the rejection
of an applicant because he was likely to injure himself in the future.7
These decisions uniformly hold that the potential cost associated
with the risk of future injury is not a legitimate reason for not hiring
an applicant. 71
On the other hand, in limited circumstances, courts have held
that the probability that an applicant may become hurt in the future
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9) (West Supp. 1991). Section 504 regulations have a similar definition.
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1991) (Department of Health and Human Services regulations).
67. See Dexler v. Carlin, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 633 (D. Conn. 1986); Prewitt v.
United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981). Cf. Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465,
467 (4th Cir. 1987) (The case law is clear that, if a handicapped employee cannot do his job, he can
be fired, and the employer is not required to assign him to alternative employment.).
68. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); 42 U.S.C.A. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (Vest Supp. 1991).
69. See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); DiPompo v. West
Point Military Academy, 708 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
70. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting
that "[a]ny qualification based on risk of future injury must be examined with special care if the
Rehabilitation Act is not to be circumvented easily, since almost all handicapped persons are at greater
risk from work-related injuries.").
71. See Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,526 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976).
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is a legitimate consideration. To prevail on such a claim, the em-
ployer must establish by competent medical evidence that there is
a reasonable probability that the applicant will incur substantial harm
if he performs the job.72 In Mantolete v. Bolger,73 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, construing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, ar-
ticulated the analysis that an employer must undertake before re-
fusing to hire an applicant because of the risk of future injury:
Such a determination cannot be based merely on an employer's subjective eval-
uation or, except in cases of a most apparent nature, merely on medical reports.
The question is whether, in light of the individual's work history and medical
history, employment of that individual would pose a reasonable probability of
substantial harm.
Such an evaluation necessarily requires the gathering of substantial information
by the employer.
In applying this standard, an employer must gather all relevant information re-
garding the applicant's work history and medical history, and independently assess
both the probability and severity of potential injury. This involves, of course, a
case-by-case analysis of the applicant and the particular job. 4
Although the ADA does not specifically refer to risk of future
injury, the House Report by the Committee on Education and Labor
noted that in limited instances this may be a legitimate ground for
refusing to hire an applicant:
A candidate, undergoing a post-offer, pre-employment medical examination may
not be excluded, for example, solely on the basis of an abnormality on an x-ray.
However, if the examining physician found that there was high probability of
substantial harm if the candidate performed the particular functions of the job
in question, the employer could reject the candidate, unless the employer could
make a reasonable accommodation to the candidate's condition that would avert
such harm and such accommodation would not cause an undue hardship.7
At least one state court has considered whether a coal company
properly refused to hire an applicant because of the possibility that
72. See State v. Metro. Airport Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Chicago
& N.W. R. R. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 283 N.W. 2d 603 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979); Ranger
Fuel Corp. v. Human Rights Comm'n., 376 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1988).
73. 767 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 1422-23.
75. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 73 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355-56.
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the applicant would injure herself in the future. The West Virginia
Supreme Court in Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights
Commission,76 held that an employer did not violate the West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Act when it refused to hire an applicant suf-
fering from psoriatic lesions for a job as a general inside laborer
in low coal, i.e., a coal seam less than forty-eight inches in height.
The employer refused to hire the individual on the basis of a rec-
ommendation by a physician who believed that the applicant would
aggravate her psoriatic lesions by crawling around in low coal and
that this would lead to secondary infection. The court found that
the coal company's failure to hire the applicant was justified because
the applicant's handicap created a reasonable probability of a ma-
terially enhanced risk of harm to her if she worked in low coal.
The "risk of future injury" defense has been used most fre-
quently by employers to justify refusals to hire applicants with
asymptomatic back conditions. In deciding these cases, courts have
considered the material fact to be the likelihood that the applicant
would develop a back injury if he or she performed the job in
question. In this regard, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State
v. Metropolitan Airport Commission77 affirmed a finding of an ad-
ministrative agency that an applicant's lower back condition would
pose a serious risk to his health if he performed the job of a building
service worker. Relying upon medical testimony, the court concluded
that a job applicant had a 50% to 7507o chance of developing a
herniated disc if he performed the job. On the other hand, in In
re State Division of Human Rights,78 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that an employer had violated state handicap law by re-
jecting an applicant for employment as a police officer because he
had spondylolisthesis 79 and widening of the lumbosacral angle. The
employer failed to hire the applicant because its physician had stated
76. 376 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1988).
77. 358 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
78. 517 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1987).
79. Courts have generally rejected employer's contentions that it is reasonably probable that
an applicant with spondylolisthesis will hurt himself or herself in the future through performing manual
labor. See Western Weighing Bureau v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations, 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1733 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1977); Rozanski v. A-P-A Transport, Inc., 512
A.2d 335 (Me. 1986).
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that the applicant had a 25%1o chance of developing back disability
within 10 to 20 years. The court held that the employer had failed
to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the applicant would
be unfit to perform his job in the future.
Finally, there are instances when an employer will reject an ap-
plicant because it believes that the applicant is a risk to the safety
of others. Because of dangers inherent in coal mining, coal com-
panies have reason to be concerned about whether employees can
safely perform mine-related jobs. In School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline,80 the United States Supreme Court held that under the
Rehabilitation Act an employer can exclude a handicapped individ-
ual from the workplace if that individual poses a direct threat to
the health or safety of others. The ADA specifically includes a pro-
vision that permits employers to refuse to hire applicants who pose
a direct threat to the health or safety of others1 The ADA defines
direct threat to mean "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 8 2
Of critical importance in these cases is the nature of the evidence
the employer must present in order to support a claim that an ap-
plicant cannot perform an essential function of the job or is a threat
to the safety of others or himself. At a minimum, in order to prevail
on this issue, the employer must show that it relied upon competent
medical testimony concerning the effects of the applicant's physical
impairment."
Courts, however, will not find an employer immune from claims
of handicap discrimination merely because the employer has relied
upon a physician's opinion.84 For example, in Wilks v. Taylor School
80. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
81. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b) (West Supp. 1991).
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(3) (West Supp. 1991).
83. See Davidson v. Shoney's Big Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d 232 fV. Va. 1989); Lewis v.
Remmele Eng'g, Inc., 314 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1981); Higgins v. Maine Cent. Ry Co., 471 A.2d 288
(Me. 1984).
84. See Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Southern Indiana Gas and Elec. Co., 544 N.E.2d 536
(Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225 (Me.
1983); Wilks v. Taylor School Dist., 435 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). But see Action Indus.
Inc. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 518 A.2d 610, 613 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding
that "employer can have a good faith defense which negates its intent to discriminate where it rea-
sonably relies upon the opinion of a medical expert in refusing to hire an applicant").
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District,85 a Michigan Court of Appeals provided two reasons why
employers should not be able to immunize themselves from handicap
suits by relying upon a physician's opinion. First, the court noted
that the employer and physician could "collude, connive, or con-
spire" to eliminate a handicapped individual's chances of employ-
ment. Second, the court noted that an employer could designate a
physician who was predisposed against handicapped individuals.
Moreover, the House Report of the Education and Labor Com-
mittee noted that the complainant can challenge the company phy-
sician's determination. In this regard, the House Report noted:
[A]ny determination by a company physician can be challenged by evidence from
the complainant's physician. Company doctors often are unfamiliar with certain
disabilities and assume that there are barriers to employment which, in fact, do
not exist. The complainant's own physician often has more knowledge about the
effects of the disability on the individual being considered. An employer is not
shielded from liability merely by a statement from the employer's physician that
a threat of imminent, substantial harm exists by hiring an applicant with a par-
ticular disability.8 6
B. Federal Mine Laws
The extent to which an applicant is protected under federal mine
health and safety laws from discrimination is not clear. An applicant
for employment is included among those classes of persons protected
from discrimination under Section 105(c) of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act. 7 (hereinafter "Mine Act"). Section 105(c)(1) of the
Mine Act provides that applicants are protected from discrimination
for the following activities: (1) he has exercised a statutory right;
(2) he has filed or made a complaint under or relating to the Mine
Act; (3) he is the subject of a medical examination and potential
transfer under Section 811 of the Mine Act; (4) he instituted a pro-
ceeding under or related to the Mine Act, or has testified, or is
about to testify, in a proceeding under the Mine Act.8" The only
85. 435 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 73-74 (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356.
87. 30 U.S.C. § 801-962 (1988).
88. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1988).
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provision that appears to apply to preemployment examinations is
where an applicant is the subject of a medical examination and po-
tential transfer under Section 811 of this title. MSHA developed the
Part 90 transfer program under Section 811(a)(7) of the Mine Act. 89
The Part 90 program provides that miners who have evidence of
developing pneumoconiosis may transfer to a less dusty part of the
mine without a loss in pay.90 Several applicants have made claims
under this section asserting that they were not hired because the
employer learned during a preemployment chest x-ray that the ap-
plicant had pneumoconiosis. 91 However, no case has proceeded to
a decision on the merits in this area.
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from dis-
criminating against employees or applicants on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.92 The questions asked of ap-
plicants for employment during a preemployment medical exami-
nation may violate Title VII. In this regard, one state court,
construing a state civil rights statute analogous to Title VII, held
that an employer committed sex discrimination when it required fe-
male employees, but not male employees, to answer questions about
urogenital health.93
An employer may also violate Title VII when it uses otherwise
neutral criteria if the criteria disproportionately impact against in-
dividuals in protected classes. To date, litigation in this area has
most frequently arisen in challenges to drug tests.
The United States Supreme Court in New York Transit Authority
v. Beazer9 4 held that an employer did not violate Title VII by re-
fusing to hire methadone users. The plaintiffs had claimed that the
employer's policy adversely impacted protected groups of African
Americans and Hispanics. The plaintiffs claimed that 62 to 65% of
methadone users in New York City were African American or His-
89. See Goff v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 3 Mine Safety & Health Cas. (BNA) 2002
(1985).
90. Id.; 30 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-90.104 (1991).
91. Secretary of Labor v. Eastern Coal Corp., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 483 (1982); Volek v. Eastern
Associated Coal Corp., Docket No. WEVA 82-244-D (ALJ Lasher, March 3, 1983).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
93. Wroblewski v. Lexington Gardens, Inc., 448 A.2d 801 (Conn. 1982).
94. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
1992]
19
Stickler and Sebok: Legal Issues Surrounding Preemployment Physical Examinations in t
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
panic. Because the plaintiffs had not shown how many methadone
users had appfied for jobs, the Court held that the plaintiff had not
introduced sufficient statistical information to show that the policy
had a disparate impact against minorities. Moreover, and more im-
portantly, the Court held that the employer had shown that the
policy was job-related.
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Chaney v. Southern Railway Co.95 reversed a district court's judg-
ment for an employer on a claim that an employer used drug test
results to discriminate against African Americans. The circuit court
found that the district court had failed to consider plaintiff's claim
that EMIT tests, a commercial test widely used to screen for certain
controlled drugs, disparately impacted African Americans. The
plaintiffs had presented expert testimony that African American per-
sons disproportionately obtained false positives through EMIT tests
because the test misread melanin fragments, the substance respon-
sible for African Americans' darker skin color, as ingested THC
fragments (THC is the predominant substance found in marijuana).
The circuit court remanded the case for the taking of further evi-
dence. It should be noted that many experts do not believe that
melanin fragments interfere with the results of an EMIT test. 6
IV. PREEMPLOYMENT PHYsicAL EXAMINATIONS AND
COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. Invasion of Privacy
State laws may provide an applicant the opportunity to pursue
a claim under the tort of invasion of privacy. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, which has been adopted by most states since its pub-
lication in 1977, recognizes four types of invasions of privacy. These
"four torts," all of which have been applied in the workplace con-
text, include: (1) appropriation, which prohibits the use of another
individual's name or likeness for commercial purposes without per-
95. 847 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1988).
96. See Richard H. Schwartz, Urine Testing in the Detection of Drugs of Abuse, 148 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 2407 (1988).
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mission; (2) unreasonable intrusion, which prohibits intentional in-
trusions upon the solitude or seclusion of another person; (3) public
disclosure of private facts, which prohibits the disclosure of matters
in the private life of a person if the publicity is highly offensive
and of no public concern; and, (4) false light, which prohibits pub-
licity that places a person in a "false light" in the public eye.
To date, plaintiffs in refusal-to-hire cases have generally limited
challenges in this area to drug testing. The gravamen of these suits
is that drug tests constitute an unreasonable intrusion into their se-
clusion. Because of the circumstances under which job applicants
are tested for drugs, a claim of invasion of privacy has not been
particularly effective. Where an employer tests applicants as a con-
dition of employment, the applicant has two options. The applicant
may consent to the test, or the applicant may refuse to take the test
and not be considered for employment. When the applicant refuses
to take the test, courts have generally found that no "invasion" has
taken place, even if the applicant's refusal has lead to an adverse
result concerning employment.98 If the applicant consents to the test,
however, no matter how reluctantly, and is not hired because of
positive test results, courts have generally found that the applicant
is barred from claiming invasion of privacy because consent is an
absolute defense. 99
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 117 at 849-69 (5th ed. 1984).
98. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) (holding that
employees discharged for refusing to take a urinalysis test did not have any claim for invasion of
privacy since no intrusion took place); cf. Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan.
1982) (holding that plaintiff who was disciplined for refusing to permit a random search of his vehicle
pursuant to company policy had no claim for an invasion of privacy because no intrusion took place);
Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff did not state
claim for invasion of privacy when he was discharged for refusing to allow his automobile to be
searched). But see Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 344 (1990) (holding that employee discharged for refusing to take urinalysis
test suffered impermissive privacy intrusion).
99. See RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977); Jevic v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 5
Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 765, 771 (D. N.J. 1990) ("Jevic, having consented to the drug
test has no more standing to assert a violation of privacy than had he lit a marijuana cigarette during
his interview."); Casse v. Louisiana Gen. Servs. Inc., 531 So. 2d 554 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (dismissing
employees' claim of invasion of privacy under Louisiana Constitution because employees consented
to the test); Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
employer's testing program did not violate applicant's right to privacy because applicant had to consent
before any testing).
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A few courts have actually considered the merits of the claim
that a drug test of an applicant violates the applicant's right to
privacy. A California Court of Appeals in Wilkinson v. Times Mir-
ror Corp.100 held that an employer did not violate an applicant's
constitutional right to privacyI01 by requiring a drug test as a con-
dition of employment. The court based this holding on three points.
First, the court noted that applicants can generally expect to be
required to pass a preemployment physical with a urinalysis test as
a condition of employment. Second, the court noted that the em-
ployer had informed job applicants of the testing program. Third,
the court stated that the employer took the specimen in a manner
designed to minimize the intrusiveness, i.e., applicants were not ob-
served while providing the specimen. However, the court noted that:
We do not hold that all preemployment drug and alcohol testing by private em-
ployers is constitutional, or that a private employer's hiring practices are abso-
lutely immune from judicial scrutiny. There may be preemployment inquiries and
requests of a personal nature which are so intrusive as to be constitutionally
unreasonable. 102
A different result may be reached where current employees are
required to submit to random drug tests. 03 In this regard, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Twigg v. Hercules Corp.104
held that an employer violated an employee's "legally protected in-
terest in privacy" when it required the employee to submit to ran-
dom drug testing. 0 5 The court carved out two exceptions to this
rule. First, employers may require a random drug test where the
employer has "reasonable good faith objective suspicion of an em-
ployee's drug usage.' 06 Second, the employer may randomly test
100. 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
101. The California Constitution provides that the right to privacy is among one of the people's
inalienable rights. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 1. California courts have held that a purely private action
may cause a violation of this clause. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
102. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
103. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 344 (1990) (holding that discharging employee for refusing to provide urine specimen
violated her constitutional right to privacy); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1990); Twigg v.
Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (,V. Va. 1990).
104. Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (V. Va. 1990).
105. Id. at 55.
106. Id.
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an employee when "an employee's job responsibility involves public
safety or the safety of others. ' 10 7 The court did not state whether
this rule would apply to the drug testing of applicants.
In addition to claims that an employer has intruded on an ap-
plicant's solitude, an applicant may also have a claim for invasion
of privacy if the employer disseminates any information that it learns
about the applicant through testing. Unlike defamation, an employer
is not immune from liability because what it publishes is true. How-
ever, an employer enjoys a limited immunity from suit if it publishes
information to only a small group of individuals who have an in-
terest in the information. Communicating information about an ap-
plicant's medical condition beyond this limited group can constitute
an invasion of privacy. 108 One court has held that it is not an in-
vasion of privacy for an employer to communicate to a union con-
fidential information concerning an employee's psychiatric condition
where the safety of other employees was involved. 0 9
One area that has spawned litigation concerns a company phy-
sician's communications about an employee's medical condition to
an employer. One code of medical ethics provides that occupational
physicians should only release information learned in preemployment
physical examinations to the employer upon the applicant's written
consent." 0 Where the employee has not provided the physician em-
ployed by the company with authorization to release information to
the employer, employees may sue both the employer and the phy-
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 5 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 885 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that plaintiff's claim that employer had disclosed to numerous co-workers that
plaintiff had a mastectomy stated claim for invasion of privacy).
109. See Davis v. Monsanto Co., 627 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
110. See Principles of Medical Ethics and Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Ju-
dicial Affairs, § 5.09. This section provides, in pertinent part, "Where a physician's services are
limited to preemployment physical examinations or examinations to determine if an employee who
has been ill or injured is able to return to work, no physician-patient relationship exists between the
physician and those individuals. Nevertheless, the information obtained by the physician as a result
of such examinations is confidential and should not be communicated to a third party without the
individual's prior written consent, unless it is required by law. If the individual authorized the release
of medical information to an employer or a potential employer, the physician should release only
that information which is redsonably relevant to the employer's decision regarding that individual's
ability to perform the work required by the job."
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sician for invasion of privacy or breach of confidence."' It is ques-
tionable whether the same result would occur if a job applicant was
involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the high costs associated with health care, absentee-
ism, and workers' compensation, coal companies are likely to con-
tinue requiring job applicants to pass preemployment physical
examinations as a condition of employment. Legal challenges to these
preemployment physical examinations will continue to increase. Al-
though a significant part of the American workforce has been pro-
tected by some type of handicap discrimination law, the publicity
that has surrounded the promulgation of the Americans With Dis-
abilities Act will lead to more applicants challenging their failure to
be hired. To avoid handicap discrimination suits, coal companies
will have to be more cautious about how they use the results ob-
tained from preemployment physical examinations.
11. See Neal v. Coming Glass Works, 5 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1636 (S.D. Ohio
1989); Crocker v. Synpol, Inc., 732 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); cf. Leggett v. First Interstate
Bank, 739 P.2d 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming jury verdict that employer had invaded employee's
privacy by contacting employee's psychologist about employee's mental condition without her consent).
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